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Protecting Native Women from Violence: 
Fostering State-Tribal Relations and the 
Shortcomings of the Violence Against 
Women Act of 2013 
by DAYNA OLSON
Not until the abuse stopped around the fourth grade did [she] 
realize she wasn’t the only child suffering at the hands of that 
assailant.  At least a dozen other young girls had fallen victim to 
that same man.  He was a man who was never arrested for his 
crimes, never brought to justice, and still walks free today, all 
because he committed these heinous acts on the reservation and 
is someone who is not a member of the tribe.  It is an unfortunate 
reality that he is unlikely to be held liable for his crimes.1
Introduction
Thousands of Native American women face this troubling issue, in 
which domestic violence and rape have become an alarmingly common part 
of their lives.  Native women face violence at astronomically high rates 
compared to any other ethnic group in the United States.2  These staggering 
statistics are the effect of poverty, the reduction of tribal sovereignty, and the 
quagmire of conflicting criminal jurisdiction between tribal, state, and 
federal prosecutors.  As a result, most of these women are left with little to 
no recourse. 
Federal legislation throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
augmented with Supreme Court jurisprudence, removed nearly all of Native 
            J. D. Candidate 2019, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  I would 
like to thank Professors Kelly D. Weisberg and Jennifer Dunn for their inspiration and guidance.  I 
would also like to thank the editorial staff of the Quarterly for all of their dedication and hard work 
in bringing this Note into fruition.  
 1.  112th CONG. REC. S5282, 5288 (July 24, 2012) (statement of Sen. Murray). 
 2.  See generally ANDRE B. ROSAY PH.D., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., RESEARCH REPORT:
VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN (2016), https://w 
ww.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249736.pdf. 
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tribes’ jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters.  Prior to 2013, tribal law 
enforcement had almost no authority over non-tribal members who commit 
crimes or other wrongful acts on reservation lands.  Lack of federal 
resources, driven by a undercurrent of historical and political tension, has 
resulted in very low prosecution rates and a patchwork of overlapping 
jurisdictions.  This lethal combination has succeeded in allowing certain 
perpetrators to become “above the law” when they commit offenses within 
tribal territory.  In an effort to combat this issue, the 2013 reauthorization of 
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) included a provision, the Special 
Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (SDVCJ), which granted tribal 
courts the authority to prosecute narrow categories of non-tribal members 
for specific crimes of intimate partner violence.3  While this enhanced 
jurisdiction modestly improved the lives of Native American women, this 
legislation imposes substantial limitations and, in effect, is only one small 
stepping-stone towards ensuring justice and safety for Native women. 
This Note will first describe the pressing issues of violence against 
women on tribal reservations and the overwhelming need for further law 
enforcement.  Section II of this Note will go into the historical details of the 
“Rubik’s cube” of tribal jurisdiction and the ever-so-murky waters of federal, 
state, and tribal authorities.  Third, this Note will discuss the reauthorization 
of VAWA 2013, which allots Special Criminal Jurisdiction to tribes for 
crimes of domestic violence and some of the major flaws therein.  Section 
IV will discuss recent legislative proposition and the current Congressional 
battles over a 2019 reauthorization.  Lastly, this Note will discuss the current 
political climate and the potential demise of VAWA by the current 
administration due to the uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of the 
SDVCJ legislation.  This Note will then go on to argue that, given the current 
political circumstances before the country, enhancing state and tribal law 
enforcement cooperation to combat these crimes within tribal territories 
would be far more beneficial to Native women, both to skirt some of the 
constitutional pitfalls of VAWA, and to provide the justice that is so urgently 
needed.
 3.  Violence Against Women Act § 904, 25 U.S.C. §1304 (2013). 
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I.  The Social Reality: Poverty, Violence, and a
“Jurisdictional Quagmire” 
Native men, women, and children face the highest rates of violence than 
any other ethnic group in the United States.4  More than four in five 
American Indian5 and Alaskan Native women have experienced physical 
violence in their lifetime.6  Approximately 56% of this violence against these 
women stems from forms of sexual violence and rape, the majority of which 
is perpetrated by an interracial partner (meaning a non-Native American or 
non-Alaskan Native abuser).7  When looking specifically at intimate partner 
violence (IPV), roughly 55% of American Indian and Alaskan Native 
women, and 43% of men have experienced physical violence.8  Rates of 
stalking, as well as emotional and psychological violence, also affect Native 
American men and women at significantly higher rates than every other 
ethnic group in the United States.9
These acts of violence lead to profound impacts on the women and men 
who have been victimized.  For female victims of physical IPV, including 
stalking and sexual violence, 38% needed medical care and 15% required 
legal services after the assault.10  Approximately 9% of men needed medical 
care and 9% required legal services.11  Forty percent of women and 9% 
percent of men missed several days of work or school because of the violence 
committed against them.12  To further highlight the difference of Native 
women compared to other ethnic and racial groups, the National Institute of 
Justice (NIJ) concluded that when compared to non-Hispanic White women, 
Native women are 1.2 times as likely to have experienced violence in their 
 4.  See generally ROSAY, supra note 2.
 5.  Throughout this Note, the terms “Indian,” “tribe,” and “Indian Country,” are utilized by 
a variety of sources.  While the terminology is certainly outdated, it is the language utilized in all 
federal case law, statutes, and legal journals on the subject.  For more information, see Zachary 
Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
657, 659 n.7 (2013). 
 6.  Id. at 43. 
 7.  Id. at 32–37; this portion of the study demonstrates with strong statistical evidence that 
native women tend to be attacked by non-native offenders, thus forcing these victims to reckon 
with the “Rubik’s cube” of tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty. 
 8.  Id. at 23–24.  This finding is contrasted with non-Hispanic white victims, where 34.5% 
of white women and 30.5% of white men experienced some form of violence by their intimate 
partners.
 9.  Id. at 31. 
 10.  Id. at 49. 
 11.  Id.
 12.  ROSAY, supra note 2, at 47. 
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lifetime and are 1.7 times as likely to have experienced violence in the past 
year.13
This disparity in the violence affecting tribal men and women has been 
the subject of intensive research by many health organizations, including the 
Center for Disease Control, whose findings have further prompted other 
health organizations to take an active role in advocacy.14  However, much of 
the issue stems from the very blatant “jurisdictional gaps” that exist within 
tribal territories, and the complex legal history between the federal 
government and tribes that hinder the prosecution of the abusers. 
Reports suggest that up to 80% of violence committed against Native 
women and men stems from non-Native American partners,15 while other 
sources estimate as much as 90% of the violence against tribal women is 
perpetrated by a non-tribal member.16  Most major crimes committed on 
tribal lands, including rape and offenses committed by non-Indians, are 
under the sole purview of federal prosecutors.17  Pre-VAWA cases, such as 
Martinez v. Martinez,18 highlight that tribal courts did not have jurisdiction 
over non-tribal members and could not successfully prosecute them for these 
crimes, thereby leaving many women wounded, violated, and without any 
legal recourse.  While the federal government maintains primary jurisdiction 
for major crimes, certain states can maintain authority over non-Indian 
offenses pursuant to a piece of Eisenhower-era legislation referred to as 
Public Law 280.19  However, IPV has been a low priority, and has often 
fallen within the “jurisdictional gaps,” allowing many perpetrators to go 
unpunished simply because these crimes are committed on reservation land. 
Tribal women who are exposed to domestic violence face stigma at 
home and have few alternatives to escape the abuse and improve their lives 
 13.  ROSAY, supra note 2, at 44. 
 14.  See generally CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010-2012 STATE REPORT (2017)
[hereinafter NISVS SURVEY] https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/nisvs/summaryreports. htm 
l; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH (2002) https://ap 
ps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/42495/9241545615_eng.pdf. 
 15.  ROSAY, supra note 2 at 2. 
 16.  Lyndsey Gilpin, Why Native American Women Still Have the Highest Rates of Rape and 
Assault, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (June 7, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairs-why-
native-american-women-still-have-the-highest-rates-of-rape-and-assault. 
 17.  See, e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2013). 
 18.  Martinez v. Martinez, No. C08-5503 FDB, 2008 WL 5262793 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 
2008) where the court found that a tribe had no jurisdiction over a nonmember in a domestic 
violence charge. 
 19.  See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamash Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Public Law 280, 18 
U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2010), discussed further in this article. 
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and those of their children.20  Fear of cultural backlash against women who 
leave the reservation, lack of domestic violence education, as well as the fear 
of leaving children and family contribute to the many reasons why Native 
American women stay on the reservation despite suffering abuse.21
An additional barrier lies within the state or federal government’s 
capacity to even respond to such incidents of violence.  For example, in 
Alaska, many rural tribal villages are only accessible by plane or boat, and it 
can often take days for the authorities to arrive after an incident.22  Other 
issues include access to reliable healthcare services, which prevent Native 
women from obtaining proper medical intervention after an assault.23  One 
reporter commented on the emergency health services offered on the 
Standing Rock reservation, stating, “At one time, the Indian Health Service 
hospital at Fort Yates administered rape kits, and then for a few years they 
didn’t, and last summer they began again.”24  This inconsistency in rape kit 
availability often deters rape and assault survivors from seeking urgently 
needed medical care, because they feel that nothing will be done about the 
assault. 
Furthermore, cultural and legal barriers prevent the tribes from properly 
assisting these victims after they have been assaulted or abused.  Many tribal 
police officers feel helpless, as they know they are severely limited in their 
ability to provide any effective remedy.  One tribal officer stated, “In the 
past, the police department would go out and when they ascertained the 
perpetrator was a non-Indian, there was nothing they could do—they would 
drive him to the edge of the reservation and just drop him off, knowing that 
 20.  Domestic Violence Rampant Among Native Americans, DOMESTICSHELTERS.ORG (Mar. 
13, 2017), https://www.domesticshelters.org/articles/statistics/domestic-violence-rampant-among-
native-americans
 21.  Gilpin, supra note 16. 
 22.  See Krista Langlois, New Law Protects Alaska Native Women, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.hcn.org/articles/new-law-protects-alaska-native-women.
 23.  Tribal health centers are severely underfunded, and many are ill equipped to treat and 
properly conduct evidence exams for sexual assault victims.  See NATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
AMERICAN INDIANS, RESOLUTION #KAN-18-005, HEALTHCARE & JUSTICE FOR SEXUAL 
ASSAULT SURVIVORS THROUGH THE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
AMERICAN INDIANS (2018), http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_APmuHrxhoHhFCbw 
GLjCLWfcBVowXNZZvuoPhuInHiZzTlqwisBK_KAN-18-005%20Final.pdf. 
This resolution is largely based upon a 2011 report that found many troubling issues regarding 
health clinics: many survivors may have to travel upwards of 150 miles to reach a facility that can 
perform a forensic exam; Indian Health Service (IHS) providers are often prevented from testifying 
in court, and that 19 out of 45 IHS facilities were unable to provide proper rape kits and had to refer 
victims elsewhere. Id.  These barriers to forensic evidence collection along with the declination of 
federal prosecution prevents perpetrators from being properly arrested and held accountable for 
their crimes.  Id.
 24.  Stephanie Ogburn, Sexual Assault on the Rez, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/sexual-assault-on-the-rez. 
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he would walk back.”25  Other barriers include the “small-town nature and 
culture of reservations, where an assaulted woman may be perceived as 
getting what she deserved.”26  Many law enforcement jurisdictions are rife 
with deeply rooted biases and prejudices against Indian tribes, which leaves 
victims of domestic violence and rape at the mercy of those who may or may 
not deem their pleas for assistance as a worthy use of their time.27
The 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women’s Act’s has 
tried to address this issue by including Article 9, which gives tribes “Special 
Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction” (SDVCJ) over non-Indian 
members.28  While this provision has made some headway in reestablishing 
tribal sovereignty, the practical application of VAWA still leaves much to be 
desired.  The limitations under which tribes can utilize the SDVCJ and the 
very narrow set of crimes for which non-Indians can be prosecuted, suggest 
that this policy has significant shortcomings that have prevented tribes from 
adequately responding to the pressing needs of their community. 
II.  U.S.–Tribal Relations and Historical Precedent 
A.  Historical Backdrop 
The relationship between white America and Native Tribes has a 
horrific history, stemming from early ‘suspect’ treaties that became out-right 
land grabs forcing tribes to be removed from their ancestral homes.  The 
newly formed federal government “pursued policies aimed at the 
assimilation of tribal members and the extinction of tribal cultural and 
political independence”29 by means of eradication if not extermination, thus 
forming the backdrop to an increasingly volatile relationship between tribes 
and the federal government of the United States.30
The 1830 Indian Removal Act gave then President Jackson the power 
to make treaties with every tribe east of the Mississippi River, consequently 
forcing tribes to surrender their land in exchange for small territories in the 
 25.  Conference: Violence Against Native Women: Resistance and Responses, CORNELL LAW 
SCHOOL (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/womenandjustice/Conferences-and-
Events/Violence-Against-Native-Women.cfm.  
 26.  Ogburn, supra note 24.  
 27.  Id.
 28.  25 U.S.C. § 1304. 
 29.  Price, supra note 5, at 669. 
 30.  Id.
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West, often in Oklahoma and the Dakotas.31  Many tribes were forced to 
relocate, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Native Americans.32
Subsequently, the Indian Appropriations Act of 1851 which created 
federally designated “Indian Areas” (mostly in modern Oklahoma) directly 
contributed to the rise in ‘boarding schools’ created by western missionaries 
to wipe out Native worship, culture, and languages.33  Soon after, the Dawes 
Act of 1887 was enacted, and became the signature legislation of what is 
known as the “Allotment Era.”34  The Dawes legislation divided reservation 
lands into private parcels, forcing poorer families to sell their land to make 
tax payments to the government.35  From the time the Act was adopted in 
1887 until Congress formally ended the program in 1934, over two-thirds of 
former tribal lands became owned by non-Indians.36  Today, a large portion, 
if not a majority, of tribal lands are inhabited by non-Indians. 
B.  Transforming Tribal Political Autonomy to Federal Control 
At the outset, the United States expressly recognized Indian Nations as 
independent sovereigns.37  A set of three Supreme Court cases in the 
nineteenth century, dubbed “Marshall’s Trilogy,” further upholds this 
notion, as these earlier cases tended to point to a larger sense of Indian tribes’ 
 31.  MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 9 (2016). 
 32.  Id. One of the most violent removals in American history, is the “Trail of Tears” in which 
the Cherokee nation was forcibly removed from eastern seaboard to the Midwest in the nineteenth 
century, thus resulting in thousands of Native American deaths.  Id.
 33.  FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 10–11.  See also Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for 
Uncivilzied Acts: Filing Suit Against the Government for American Indian Boarding School 
Abuses, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 45, 54–57.  The American government built schools 
on reservation land, and forced Native American parents to send their children to these brutal 
institutions, else forego their food rations and starve.  “[P]arents who tried to hide their children 
were thwarted by government workers who literally ran down the children, roped them like cattle, 
and took them away from their parents, many times never to return.”  Id. at 56. 
 34.  Id. at 11. See also County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima 
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992), wherein Justice Scalia aptly summarizes this horrific time 
period of American Indian history, “The objectives of allotment were simple and clear cut: to 
extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force assimilation of Indians into 
the society at large . . . many of the early allottees quickly lost their land through transactions that 
were unwise or even procured by fraud.”  Scalia further notes that even those who were not 
defrauded of their land, were “deprived of an opportunity to acquire agricultural and other self-
sustaining economic skills, thus compromising Congress’ purpose of assimilation.”  Id. See infra
note 144 and accompanying text. 
 35.  Id. at 11. 
 36.  Id.
 37.  See Commerce Clause: Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 3. “To regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . .” 
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political sovereignty than what we see today.38  In Johnson v. M’Intosh,
Chief Justice Marshall stated that the Indian tribe’s power was “to a 
considerable extent, impaired . . . their rights to complete sovereignty, as 
independent nations, were necessarily diminished.”39
The result of the Johnson decision severely mangled the inherent rights 
of Native Americans to their lands, and gave them only the right of 
occupancy over their ancestral home.40  By advancing the “international law-
derived doctrine of discovery,” the newly formed U.S. government had 
effectively removed all land title from Native tribes.41  Nevertheless, the 
tribes were still considered to be politically independent in the sense that the 
traditional “conqueror-and-conquered relationship” was significantly 
modified as applied to Native tribes.42  Despite undergoing a considerable 
loss under the Johnson ruling, the federal government viewed the tribes as 
separate sovereign nations whose political autonomy remained intact.43
However, approximately a decade later, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
the Court began to retract this notion of tribal sovereignty, by holding that 
the tribes are “domestic dependent” nations whose relationship “resemble[d] 
that of a ward to his guardian.”44  One year later, in Worcester v. Georgia,
Marshall dubbed the tribes a “distinct community occupying its own 
territory,” and held that whomever stepped upon their lands was thereby 
subject to their laws and regulations as well as any applicable federal laws.45
Under this interpretation, the individual tribes were again recognized as a 
politically and socially autonomous bodies, who, in the eyes of Justice 
Marshall, were dependent upon the nation for protection, in a paternalistic 
sense, to maintain “territorial and political integrity.”46  While the Cherokee
Nations and Worcester Courts seemingly infantilized the tribes in so far as 
their “need” for dependence upon the United States, scholars argue that these 
cases still upheld the “exercise, not the surrender of the tribe’s sovereign 
national character”;47 a sharp contrast to the Court’s future holdings that 
 38.  See generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 39.  Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823). 
 40.  Id. at 574.  
 41.  N. BRUCE DUTHU, SHADOW NATIONS: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LIMITS OF 
LEGAL PLURALISM, 79–80 (2013). 
42.  Id.
 43.  Id.
 44.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1831). 
 45.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). 
 46.  DUTHU, supra note 41, at 80. 
 47.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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subsequently developed in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
wherein tribal sovereignty was substantially diminished. 
Following the groundwork laid out in “Marshall’s Trilogy,” in 1883 the 
Supreme Court handed down a contentious decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog,
in which a member of the Brule Sioux band murdered another member on 
tribal lands.48  The defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging 
that the federal government had no jurisdiction to try him for the crime for 
which he had been sentenced to death.49  The Court agreed and held that the 
federal courts were without jurisdiction to find or try the defendant, and that 
there lacked “a clear expression of the intention of Congress . . .” to grant the 
federal government jurisdiction over Indians in such cases; thus his 
conviction became void.50
The result of this case spurred Congress to pass the Major Crimes Act, 
which gave the federal government, exclusive of the states and tribes, 
authority over specified sets of violent crimes when committed by a Native 
American within tribal lands.51  The Major Crimes Act, as described below, 
was one of the first pieces of federal legislation that extended federal 
jurisdiction over individual Indians, and paved the way for Congress to assert 
authority over Indians via their plenary powers.52  As Native American 
scholar, Bruce Duthu, aptly puts, “[t]he jurisdictional intrusiveness of this 
law cannot be overstated since it represented the first major attempt by the 
federal government to regulate the affairs of the Indians rather than with the 
Indians.”53
For certain minor crimes that take place between one tribal member and 
another tribal member the tribes themselves have jurisdiction; these are 
typically limited to misdemeanors or localized offenses.54  However, the 
Major Crimes Act stripped the tribes of their ability to try any felony or 
serious criminal act. 
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of 
another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, 
namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming . . . incest, 
a felony assault . . . an assault against an individual who has not 
 48.  Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883). 
 49.  Id.
 50.  Id. at 572. 
 51.  See generally, 679, The Major Crimes Act—18 U.S.C. § 1153, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEYS, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-
resource-manual-679-major-crimes-act-18-usc-1153.
 52.  DUTHU, supra note 41, at 83. 
 53.  Id.
 54.  18 U.S.C. §1152. 
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attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, 
burglary, robbery within the Indian country, shall be subject to 
the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any 
of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States.55
Shortly after the enactment of the Major Crimes Act, the Court faced a 
challenge to the Act’s constitutionality in United States v. Kagama.56 An
Indian defendant, who was accused of murdering an Indian victim, argued 
that the law was beyond the scope of the federal government’s power.57  By 
upholding the Major Crimes Act, the Court found that the right to federal 
power over Indians was a natural result of the federal ownership of the 
territories and states which the tribes occupied.  This right of “exclusive 
sovereignty” was further justified by the Court by describing the so-called 
“baseless” and “helpless” nature of the tribes.58  Borrowing some of the 
language from its decision in Cherokee Nations, the Court again posited that 
the tribes were “wards” of the nation who required the federal government’s 
protection from the States as well their assistance in providing them with 
food and resources for survival.59  This sense of paternalism strongly swayed 
the outcome of this case.  However unlike the Marshall Trilogy and its 
progeny, the Kagama Court further propelled the tribes away from their 
once-held political sovereignty, toward a state of near-complete dependence 
upon the federal government. 60
C.  Tribal Sovereignty in the Twentieth Century 
From the late nineteenth century into the twentieth century, several 
Congressional actions and Supreme Court decisions further diminished tribal 
authority.  In 1978, in the seminal case Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
the Court depleted the remnants of tribal authority, by affirming the notion 
that tribes have no inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.61
 55.  See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §1153 (emphasis added). 
 56.  118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 57.  U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 376 (1886). 
 58.  Id. at 383–84. 
 59.  Id.
 60.  DUTHU, supra note 41, at 83–84. 
 61.  435 U.S. 191 (1978); Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §476; Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 25 U.S.C.S. § 1302.  Within Oliphant’s holding, Justice Rehnquist notes that 
the Indian Civil Rights Act, and the Indian Reorganization Act do not explicitly give tribes the right 
to prosecute non-members; these Acts merely give defendants’ rights similar to those of federal 
due process, and allow the tribes to modify their own trial proceedings.  Oliphant, 435 U.S. at n6. 
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In Oliphant, two non-Indian residents of the Suquamish reservation 
were arrested by tribal authorities, one charged with assaulting a tribal 
officer, the other charged with reckless endangerment and injury to tribal 
property.62  The Suquamish tribe argued that their right to punish non-Indian 
offenders stemmed from the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, and the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.63  However, the court found that no such 
Congressional act “confirmed” their jurisdiction over non-Indians, and thus 
the Court held that Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to penalize 
non-Indian offenders. 64
This was a major blow to the Native American tribes.  Prior notions of 
“inherent sovereignty” and “self-determination” were completely 
obliterated.  Furthermore, the Court’s holding advanced the twentieth-
century trend of removing and abolishing the rights of Native Americans 
tribes.
1. Duro, Lara, and “the Duro Fix”
In the late twentieth century, the Court’s decision in Duro v. Reina
implicated the idea that it was unconstitutional for individual tribal courts to 
exercise authority over members of a different tribe.65  This case presented 
another layer of jurisdictional issues, in that federal officers (and state 
officers in PL-280 jurisdictions) declined to prosecute these crimes, thus 
leaving no remedy available for the land-owning tribe.66  This case has since 
been overturned by statute (referred to as the Duro-fix) within the Indian 
Civil Rights Act, which states the following: 
“[P]owers of self-government” means and includes all 
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, 
 62.  Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194–95. 
 63.  Id. at 195 n 6.  See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 64.  Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211–12. 
 65.  495 U.S. 676 (1990).  The defendant in Duro was a member of one tribe, but was charged 
and prosecuted for murder by another tribe.  Id. at 679.  Prior to this the federal prosecutors indicted 
him under the Major Crimes Act, but he was later dismissed.  Id. at 679–80.  Objecting to a foreign 
tribe’s jurisdiction over him, the defendant filed a habeus motion, and the case ultimately led to the 
Supreme Court. Id. at 682–83.  Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy held that simply by having 
membership in one tribe, did not mean that the defendant consented to the laws of another, and thus 
the prosecuting tribe had no authority to try him for the murder that took place on their reservation.  
Id. at 695–97.  Seemingly, Kennedy viewed the tribes as individual independent sovereigns, who 
could only control or maintain authority over their own members regardless of whether other tribal 
members entered their reservation lands; this was quickly overturned by the Duro-fix statute.  See
infra note 67. 
 66.  See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981), in which the Court held that 
the only two sources of tribal authority over non-members were 1) through inherent sovereignty of 
the tribe, or 2) by way of positive law. 
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legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by 
and through which they are executed, including courts of Indian 
offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby 
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.67
The decision in United States v. Lara upheld Congress’s authority to 
overturn Duro with this statute, purely with respect to Native Americans.68
The defendant, Lara, a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa 
Indians, was married to a member of the Spirit Lake Nation tribe and resided 
on their reservation.69  Lara’s acts of domestic violence against his wife 
resulted in him being banished from the reservation, and upon his return he 
assaulted a federal officer.70  He was subsequently charged by both the tribal 
court and the federal prosecutors for assault.71  In its opinion, the Court both 
affirmed the validity of the “Duro-fix” statute72 and articulated for the first 
time that Congress’s authority over Indian affairs, as granted by its plenary 
powers, are “necessarily inherent in any Federal Government.”73
2.  PL 280, the Tribal Law and Order Act, and the Impact of Forced 
State Jurisdiction 
In the early twentieth century, the federal government attempted to 
reduce the size and amount of Native reservations by systematically 
disbanding tribal governments.74  In 1953, Public Law 280 (“PL 280”) was 
yet another step in this “Termination Era,” in which the federal government 
transferred legal authority to prosecute crimes that would otherwise be 
subject to federal jurisdiction to state law enforcement.75  PL 280 was 
initially imposed upon the six states with the largest swaths of tribal 
territories: California, Oregon, Minnesota, Arizona, Wisconsin, and Alaska 
 67.  25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). 
 68.  United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 69.  Id. at 196. 
 70.  Id.
 71.  Lara, 541 U.S. at 196.  
 72.  FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 363. 
 73.  Lara, 541 U.S. at 201. 
 74.  DUTHU, supra note 41. 
 75.  Public Law 280 states “Each of the States . . . shall have jurisdiction over offenses 
committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country . . . to the same extent that such State 
has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State, and the criminal laws of such 
State shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within 
the State.” See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 § 2(a) (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26, 28 U.S.C. § 1360).  See generally DUTHU, supra note 
41. See infra note 144. 
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(later upon statehood).76  President Eisenhower’s aim was to combat the so-
called “lawlessness that pervaded Indian Country,” and to provide a better 
way to remedy the so-called chaos that took place within.77
However, this aim has been subject to extreme criticism, with many 
scholars pointing to PL 280 as a “tremendous––and continuing––failure in 
most states.”78  Carol Goldberg, a Native American legal scholar, has written 
extensively on the subject, citing several problems that the federal 
government created by enacting PL 280, including augmentation of the 
complex “jurisdictional patchwork,” and lack of funding for states to even 
prosecute these crimes.79  As one might expect, a decline in federal funding 
led to decreases in the number of court systems and police departments on 
the reservations, resulting in “a total vacuum of criminal jurisdiction, leading 
to the very ‘lawlessness’ that Public Law 280 was designed to address.”80
This legislation received strong opposition from the tribes as well, most 
of whom firmly believe that by transferring the power to the states, the 
government had yet again, diminished tribal sovereignty.81  The states have 
likewise criticized PL 280, as the federal government drastically increased 
the burden on state law enforcement, while refusing to increase any funding 
or provide adequate resources for handling these additional 
responsibilities.82
Following its initial enactment, some states, including Florida, Arizona 
and Nevada, voluntarily became PL 280 states.83  PL 280 was amended in 
1968 to require tribal consent before state jurisdiction, and to allow the states 
to give back some jurisdiction to the federal government.84  No tribe has 
 76.  DUTHU, supra note 41.
 77.  Carole Goldberg, Goldberg: State jurisdiction overlooked problem in criminal justice 
debate, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (July 13, 2007), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/g 
oldberg-state-jurisdiction-overlooked-problem-in-criminal-justice-debate/.
 78.  FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 330. 
 79.  See Goldberg, supra note 77. 
 80.  Id.
 81.  Id.
 82.  Id. See also, Emma Garrison, Baffling Distinctions Between Criminal and Regulatory: 
How Public Law 280 Allows Vague Notions of State Policy to Trump Tribal Sovereignty, 8 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 449 (2004), explaining that PL-280, as initially enacted, made the 
distinction between laws that are criminal and prohibitory and those that are civil and regulatory.  
While the PL-280 states technically only had jurisdiction to enforce criminal laws, state and lower 
federal circuits in the mid-twentieth century were varied in their responses as how to apply this 
distinction. See generally Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State 
Authority Over Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 923 (2012), 
arguing that appointing state jurisdiction in criminal law arena “has made a bad situation worse.”  
 83.  ANDREA WILKINS, FOSTERING STATE-TRIBAL COLLABORATION: AN INDIAN LAW
PRIMER, 40 (2016). 
 84.  FLETCHER, supra note 31 at 342. 
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assented to state jurisdiction since the1968 amendment.85  PL 280 led to a 
legacy of catastrophe on the relationships between the tribes, the states and 
the federal governments.  By adding to the complexities of the “patchwork 
jurisdiction,” and leaving the state governments ill-equipped to handle the 
increased responsibilities, PL 280 only amplified pre-existing problems on 
tribal reservations. 
Several decades later, President Obama enacted the Tribal Law and 
Order Act (TLOA) of 2010––arguably as a precursor to the VAWA 2013 
reauthorization––to encourage greater law enforcement on tribal lands and 
to help mend some of the issues surrounding PL 280 states.86  Specifically, 
the aim was to address the violence against women by enhancing the tribe’s 
sentencing authority and giving them the ability to seek redress outside of 
the confines of state prosecutors.87  This also amended a portion of PL 280 
by allowing tribes to request that the federal government take concurrent 
criminal jurisdiction for specific crimes, so long as they acquire the approval 
and consent of the Attorney General.88
One of the main accomplishments of TLOA was the sentencing 
enhancement, which allowed tribes to authorize up to three years of 
imprisonment and fines of up to $15,000 in criminal proceedings in which 
they have jurisdiction.89  However, in order to properly exercise this right, 
the tribes must follow specific statutory requirements, in that proceedings 
must take place in a court of record, the judge must be licensed to practice 
law, and the defense counsel must provide and yield effective legal 
assistance.90  This provision also encourages tribes to use their own cultural 
and social traditions by allowing “alternatives to incarceration or 
correctional options . . . [as a different] form of punishment.”91
Another widely praised accomplishment of the TLOA, is the mandate 
that the government disclose and explain their declination of prosecutions.  
Prior to the TLOA enactment, the overburdened federal prosecutors declined 
65% of rape charges, and over 61% of cases involving the sexual abuse of 
children.92  Once these cases were declined from the federal government, the 
 85.  FLETCHER, supra note 31 at 342. 
 86.  Tribal Law & Order Act, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, http:// 
www.ncai .org/tribal-vawa/resources/tribal-law-order-act. 
 87.  Id.
 88.  18 U.S.C. § 1162(d). 
 89.  18 U.S.C. §1302(c); see also Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 
124 Stat. 2258 (codified as amended in scattered section of 25 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 90.  18 U.S.C. §1302(c)(1), (3), and (5). 
 91.  18 U.S.C. §1302(d)(1) and (2). 
 92.  Timothy Williams, Higher Crime, Fewer Charges on Indian Land, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/us/on-indian-reservations-higher-crime-and-fewer-
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tribes were seldom able to receive the evidence, thus many of the 
perpetrators, even in very “cut and dry” cases, received no reprimand or any 
punishment.93  This effort to increase transparency and understanding of the 
lack of federal prosecutions has been met with modest success, showing 
improved declination rates since its inception.94  The establishment of the 
Indian Law and Order Commission (ILOC) which “was charged with 
developing a comprehensive study of the criminal justice system” within 
Indian country, has also been credited with increasing the transparency for 
federal prosecutorial denials.95
III.  The 2013 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women 
Act: A (Partial) Oliphant-Fix 
In the years following the passage of TLOA, victim advocates and 
lobbyists joined forces to address the violence against Native people, 
particularly that of domestic violence and human trafficking, highly 
prevalent issues that disproportionately affect Native Americans.  An 
Amnesty International report in 2007 highlighted many of the 
aforementioned jurisdictional gaps that prevented Indian men and women 
from obtaining justice.96  The government’s own statistics, combined with 
the NISVS Survey, also demarcated the drastic situation faced by Indian 
women. 97
In addition to this newly collected data,98 several stories from Native 
women flooded the internet, several of which became viral on social media99,
bringing a new passion and fervor to activists and lobbyists to address 
violence against Native women.100  Native American activist, and former 
Vice-Chairman of the Tulalip Tribe’s Board of Directors, Deborah Parker, 
was among those who shared personal stories about the violence against 
Native women through the media.101  In her moving speech to Congress on 
prosecutions.html?_r=3&pagewanted=1&ref=us (commenting that federal prosecutors decline 
more than 60% of domestic violence offenses, but less than 20% of drug-related offenses). 
 93.  Id.
 94.  Angela Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564, 1588 
(2016) (citing Timothy Williams, U.S. Says It Pursues More Prosecutions on Indian Lands, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 2013), noting a rise to 69% of cases prosecuted since the passage of the TLOA). 
 95.  Riley, supra note 94, at 1588. 
 96.  See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA, 27–40 (2007). 
 97.  See Riley supra note 94 at 1589–90. 
 98.  See NISVS SURVEY, supra note 13. 
 99.  Women Senators, Tribal Leader Discuss Importance of VAWA Improvements, YOUTUBE
(Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIV7-XASQy8.  
 100.  See Riley, supra note 94, at 1588. 
 101.  Tribal Leader Discuss Importance of VAWA Improvements, supra note 99. 
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the reauthorization of VAWA, she highlighted her own personal experiences 
with domestic abuse, and urged her fellow Native American women to stand 
up and fight against such abuses,102 thereby “beginning a cascade of Native 
women’s personal narratives about interracial violence.”103
Shortly thereafter, the New York Times published a story about the 
Congressional debate on the VAWA provision that highlighted the lived 
experiences of Diane Millich.104  Her ex-husband, who was non-Indian, 
began to relentlessly abuse her soon after they had married and settled on the 
Southern Ute reservation in Colorado.105  Despite several pleas to tribal law 
enforcement, and the county sheriff’s offices, she could not receive any help, 
as their hands were effectively tied.106  Tribal police could not prosecute a 
non-Indian despite being on reservation land, and local sheriffs could not 
assist an Indian on the reservation.  At one point, Diane’s husband even 
called the county sheriffs “to prove to her that he could not be stopped.”107
Diane’s story gained traction among domestic violence victims’ advocates 
and lobbyists, and helped propel the conversation towards increasing tribal 
domestic violence jurisdiction. 
This renewed social activism, augmented with decades worth of 
staggering statistics on Native American violence was finally met with 
success, as the VAWA reauthorization was signed by President Obama in 
2013 and fully enacted in 2015.108  This Act significantly departs from 
Oliphant, by creating a Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction 
(SDVCJ) under which tribes have legally codified authority to criminally 
prosecute non-Indians for specific crimes of domestic violence.109  The 
 102.  Women Senators, Tribal Leader Discuss Importance of VAWA Improvements, supra note 
99.
 103.  Riley, supra note 94, at 1590. 
 104.  Jonathan Weisman, Measure to Protect Women Stuck on Tribal Land Issue, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/us/politics/violence-against-women-act-
held-up-by-tribal-land-issue.html. 
 105.  Id.
 106.  Id.
 107.  Id.
 108.  Hansi Lo Wang, For Abused Native American Women, New Law Provides A ‘Ray Of 
Hope,’ NPR (Feb. 20, 2014), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/02/20/280189261/for-abused-native-american-
women-new-law-provides-a-ray-of-hope.  During the first two years of its inception, VAWA’s 
SDVCJ was merely a “pilot program” that applied to a few select tribes; only in 2015 could the 
remaining tribes petition the Department of Justice to join and utilize this prosecutorial authority.  
SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION PILOT PROJECT REPORT, NAT’L
CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/NewsArticle_VutTUSYSfGPRpZQRYzWcuLekuVN 
eeTAOBBwGyvkWwPRUJOioqI_SDVCJ%20Pilot%20Project%20Report_6-7-16_Final.pdf 
[hereinafter PILOT PROJECT REPORT]. 
 109.  See generally 25 U.S.C. §1304. 
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VAWA provision narrowly describes those defendants who can successfully 
be hailed into tribal court to be tried and prosecuted for crimes of domestic 
violence.  Non-Indian defendants must be ‘closely tied’ to the tribe by either 
their employment or their intimate or dating relationship with a tribal 
member.110
A participating tribe may exercise special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction over a defendant only if the defendant—(i) 
resides in the Indian country of the participating tribe; (ii) is 
employed in the Indian country of the participating tribe; or (iii) 
is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of—(I) a member 
of the participating tribe; or (II) an Indian who resides in the 
Indian country of the participating tribe.111
However, these requirements leave out anyone who does not maintain 
these direct ties to the tribe but who nonetheless commit these crimes on the 
territory (a circumstance known as “stranger rape”). 
In addition, the statute delineates that the crimes committed by these 
defendants must be those of either domestic violence or dating violence, or 
a violation of a protective order.  To be heard in tribal court, protective order 
violations must have occurred in the Indian Country of the participating tribe 
and must violate a portion of the order that prohibits “violent or threatening 
acts or harassment against, sexual violence against, contact or 
communication with, or physical proximity to, another person; (ii) was 
issued against the defendant; (iii) is enforceable by the tribe; and (iv) is 
consistent with section 2265(b) of Title 18.”112  These requirements are 
imposed in order to comport with the Indian Civil Rights Act, and the Bill 
of Rights in order to ensure due process requirements for non-Indian 
defendants are met.113
A.  Shortcomings of VAWA 2013 Special Domestic Violence 
Criminal Jurisdiction 
While VAWA has made substantial progress in providing a remedy for 
this serious issue that affects members of all Native American tribes, the 
legislation is far from perfect and still leaves many gaps that Congress must 
 110.  25 U.S.C. §1304 (b)(4)(A); see also Jerry Gardner, Building Tribal Capacity to Exercise 
TLOA Enhanced Sentencing and/or VAWA “Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction” 
over Non-Indians, TRIBAL INSTITUTE (2013) http://www.tribal-institute.org/download/Drug%20C 
ourt/WomenAreSacredConference.pdf. 
 111.  25 U.S.C. §1304(b)(4)(B). 
 112.  25 U.S.C. §1304(c)(2). 
 113.  See, PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 108, at 3. 
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close.  The SDVCJ has been dubbed a “partial” Oliphant fix, in that child 
abuse, elder abuse, and sexual assault by a stranger––unless either one of 
these crimes violates a preexisting restraining order––are not covered by the 
expanded criminal authority of the tribes.114  Furthermore, VAWA section 
904 is incredibly specific with regards to who fits within the parameters of a 
“dating partner,” and tribal leaders have called to expand this jurisdiction to 
include the offenses of “stranger rape,” sex trafficking, and child and elder 
abuse.115  The narrow jurisdiction allotted to the tribes prevents them from 
prosecuting for these crimes should they fall outside of the purview of a pre-
existing restraining order, or if the perpetrator does not meet any other 
criteria to be properly tried as a “defendant” under the VAWA legislation.116
While the VAWA reauthorization has given funding for shelters and 
24-hour hotlines to increase ease of reporting, significant barriers remain in 
place and must be dismantled before we can see a decrease in domestic 
violence on Native reservations.  Despite the efforts of these legislative 
measures, there are many sociological issues that have been left unaddressed 
in both VAWA and the TLOA.  Gun violence and drugs and alcohol-related 
crimes, are just some of the pervasive problems on reservations that only 
enhance the likelihood of violence against women.  This has led some to 
criticize VAWA for not providing adequate funding for rehabilitation 
programs. 
B.  Objections to VAWA 2013: Constitutional Issues Arising Out 
of Title IX 
Congressional debate around the reauthorization of the 2013 VAWA 
stemmed largely from the constitutionality of the SDVCJ.  The granting of 
authority to tribal courts to prosecute non-Native American defendants was 
a contentious issue that raised significant concerns among conservative 
Congressmen and women.117  While the Court has yet to address a direct 
 114.  § 1304(c)(2). 
 115.  Krista Langlois, New Law Protects Alaskan Native Women, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Dec. 
24, 2014), http://www.hcn.org/articles/new-law-protects-alaska-native-women. 
 116.  While highly important, this note will not be delving into these topics individually.  For 
more information see, Gabrielle Mandeville, Note, Sex Trafficking On Indian Reservations, 51 
TULSA L. REV. 181 (2015); Marie Quasius, Note, Native American Rape Victims: Desperately 
Seeking an Oliphant-Fix, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1902 (2009). 
 117.  Mitch Perry, Gus Bulirakis defends 2013 opposition to Violence Against Women’s Act,
FLORIDA POLITICS (Mar. 1, 2018), https://floridapolitics.com/archives/257763-gus-bilirakis-
defends-2013-opposition-violence-womens-act; Mercedes White, Why some oppose extension to 
Violence Against Women Act, DESERET NEWS (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.deseretnews.com/artic 
le/865573170/Why-some-oppose-extension-to-Violence-Against-Women-Act.html; Seung Min 
Kim, Senate renews anti-violence law, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2013),  https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2013/02/senate-passes-violence-against-women-act-087518.  
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challenge to VAWA’s Title IX provision, there is still some doubt and 
speculation as to its constitutional validity.  Likely challenges to the VAWA 
Title IX provision include issues surrounding the constitutional due process 
protections for Non-Indian defendants, and issues surrounding the authority 
of tribal courts and the complexities involved with the Appointments Clause.  
In addition, the heavily weighted precedent of Oliphant, its potential effect 
on the constitutionality of the VAWA legislation and the implication of the 
double jeopardy clause stemming from such precedent are also of concern to 
those who are skeptical about the lasting impact of the SDVCJ. 
1.  Due Process Protections for Defendants 
VAWA’s provision that mandates fair counsel presents a monetary 
burden on the individual tribes, and has the potential to drastically alter the 
ways in which certain tribes operate.  Tribal judge panels vary in size, and 
while some tribal criminal proceedings mirror our traditional Anglo-
American model of criminal procedure, many tribes have judges, 
peacemakers, or tribal elders who are generally appointed or elected for the 
position.118  Congressional legislators expressed their concerns with these 
facts and the implications of what these meant for non-Indian defendants 
who would be tried in tribal courts, arguing that this expansion would 
undoubtedly result in the deprivation of Constitutional and Due Process 
rights for these defendants.119
However, there is an equally convincing argument that a Constitutional 
challenge on these grounds would not result in the termination of this 
legislation.  The VAWA legislation explicitly states that the tribes need to 
provide counsel, and a fair cross-section of the community (meaning both 
Indians and non-Indians are required) for jury panels.  In addition, VAWA 
provides a ‘catch-all’ provision for “all other rights whose protection is 
necessary under the Constitution of the United States.”120  Essentially, this 
has come to mean that in order to prosecute non-Indian offenders, tribes must 
be able to provide a criminal defendant with all of the legal rights that he or 
she would be granted in a federal proceeding. 
 118.  CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 79 
(2004).
 119.  See Dr. Coburn Speaks on the Senate Floor Regarding the Violence Against Women Act,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y_uV7Nt6aG8&feature=youtu.be 
(arguing that many tribal courts do not recognize the Bill of Rights in the same sense as traditional 
U.S. court, and recognizing tribal jurisdiction in this manner “tramples on the rights of every 
American who is not a tribal member.”). 
 120.  25 U.S.C. §1304(d)(4). 
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2.  The Relationship Between Article 3 Courts, Article 4, and the 
Tribes
The tenuous nature of the status of Native tribes and their legal 
relationship with the federal court system, has led to further criticism about 
the VAWA Title IX legislation.  Specifically, this section will address those 
concerns that stem from Republican-leaning scholars and conservative think 
tanks who find VAWA to be an overstep of both Congressional and Tribal 
authority.  Heritage Foundation attorney, Paul Larkin, argued that while the 
SDVCJ provision in VAWA 2013 has made steps in the “eventual right 
direction,” there are significant drawbacks regarding tribal authority, which 
could lead the legislation to be deemed unconstitutional if, or when, a legal 
challenge arises to the Courts.121  Specifically his concerns lie within the 
Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution and the judicial powers 
within Article III.  Larkin argues that while Congress may create criminal 
courts that do not need Article III guarantees, this applies to the states and 
territories that are fully and unalterably incorporated into the “union.”122
Tribal reservations are not territories and are, rather, defined as “‘distinct 
tracts’ of land that are set aside or ‘reserved’ by the United States for 
‘occupancy’ and use of a tribe under a treaty, statute, or executive order.”123
In addition, the “Equal Footing Doctrine”124 of the United States 
Constitution grants each state certain rights, including territorial integrity.125
This doctrine can be found within Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1, which 
states that, “ . . . no new State shall be formed or erected within the 
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Jurisdiction 
of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the 
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”126  This 
provision applies to the formation of new sovereign Indian territories, further 
complicating solidification of tribal sovereignty. 
 121.  Paul Larkin, Domestic Abuse on Indian Reservations: How Congress Failed to Protect 
Women Against Violence, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.heri 
tage.org/civil-rights/report/domestic-abuse-indian-reservations-how-congress-failed-protect-
women-against#_ftnref25.  This argument, reflecting the potential constitutional issues stemming 
from increased tribal sovereignty, was the primary focal point for many of the GOP Senators and 
House Representatives who voted against the 2013 reauthorization.  See infra Part IV. 
 122.  Id.
 123.  Id.
 124.  The term “equal footing” originated from the 1787 Constitutional Convention that 
provided all new states be admitted “in all respects, on an equal footing with their Bretheren.”  1 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 440 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) available 
at ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY, https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1057#Farrand_0544-01_53. 
 125.  Id.
 126.  U.S. CONST. art. IV § 3, cl. 1. 





      04/24/2019   08:06:49
OLSON_FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019 4:47 PM
Summer 2019]                  PROTECTING NATIVE WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE 841 
Although this particular subject is beyond the scope of this Note, these 
arguments can be refuted.  By recognizing that tribal authority arises from 
federal authority, and that the SDVCJ is an extension of this, tribal courts 
can legally be considered non-Article III courts, thereby circumventing this 
Constitutional concern.127
3.  Legal Precedent with Oliphant, and Double Jeopardy Concerns 
Considering the weight of the Oliphant decision, the Court may decide 
that the SDVCJ legislation, which deviates so broadly from precedent, 
should be overturned.  As Justice Rehnquist states in Oliphant, “ . . . it was 
apparently assumed that the tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty provision to that 
effect.”128  Justice Rehnquist’s opinion goes on to cite brief portions of 
eighteenth-century treaties that support this view.129  However, further 
historical analysis, reveals contradictory findings.  The text of the 1786 
Treaty with the Choctaw, states that those who “attempt to settle on any of 
the lands . . . shall forfeit the protection of the United States of America, and 
the Indians may punish him or not as they please.”130  Should a future 
challenge arise, the Court should examine the historical precedent rather than 
simply relying on the scant findings cited in the Oliphant decision.131
Following the Oliphant decision, scholars have argued, that “[i]f tribal 
prosecutions of non-Indian defendants flow from delegated federal authority, 
then a tribe could not prosecute conduct that was already the subject of a 
federal prosecution, no matter how many rights the defendants would have 
under tribal criminal procedure.”132  This concern bleeds into issues 
surrounding the “double jeopardy” clause of the Constitution, which 
normally prevents defendants from being tried twice for the same crime.133
Many Congressional leaders who expressed doubts before the VAWA 
 127.  See  Margaret H. Zhang, Comment, Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction For 
Indian Tribes: Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Versus Defendants’ Complete Constitutional Rights,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 267 n.117 (2015) (“If courts rule that special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction stems from delegated federal authority rather than inherent tribal sovereignty, tribes 
could answer the Article III contentions by arguing that the jurisdiction is still valid as an exercise 
of jurisdiction by a congressionally sanctioned non-Article III court.”).   
 128.  Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197. 
 129.  Id. at 198. 
 130.  Treaty of Hopewell with the Choctaw, Art. IV, 7 Stat. 21 (1786).  
 131.  DEWI IOAN BALL, THE EROSION OF TRIBAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT’S SILENT
REVOLUTION, 173–74 (2016). 
 132.  Margaret H. Zhang, Comment: Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction for 
Indian Tribes: Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Versus Defendants’ Complete Constitutional Rights,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 266 (2015). 
 133.  U.S. CONST. amend V. 
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reauthorization believed there to be a substantial risk for a non-Indian to be 
tried both in federal and tribal courts.  The rationale behind this idea is that 
since the SCDVJ is a federally authorized expansion of power, any 
prosecution that arises under this provision is rooted in “some federally-
delegated authority.”134
This argument isn’t without merit, as the Court has previously held in 
United States v. Wheeler that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against 
“double jeopardy” was not violated when he was convicted under the Navajo 
Nation’s tribal court and later convicted by a federal court for the same 
crime, as the convictions were brought by two distinct “sovereigns.”135  This 
is reflected in the recent holding in U.S. v. Bryant, where the Court found 
that “Indian tribal court convictions for domestic assault were sufficient to 
convict defendant of federal offense of domestic assault by habitual offender, 
even though defendant had no right to counsel in tribal court, since 
convictions were valid under tribal law . . .”136  Although the SDVCJ is still 
in its infancy, and only a few convictions have gone through an appeals 
process, Bryant’s holding suggests that the Court is willing to recognize  
tribal authority as coming from a distinct sovereign. 
Thus, it is likely that a particular argument that SDVCJ violates the 
Fifth Amendment would not stand, as the double jeopardy clause does not 
apply when crimes come from two distinct sovereigns.137  Here, the VAWA 
provision uses similar language to the Indian Civil Rights Act, which 
“indicates that the Congress intends for tribes to draw their power to 
prosecute nonmember Indians from their “inherent” tribal power, “not 
delegated federal power.”138  Thus, using the language derived from 
legislation, the prosecution of these crimes does not “flow” from the federal 
government, but rather directly from the tribes themselves, who are a 
separate entity with their own sovereign powers, thereby refuting any claims 
of double jeopardy.139
 134.  Shefali Singh, Closing the Gap of Justice: Providing Protection for Native American 
Women through the Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction Provision of VAWA, 28 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 220–21 (2014). 
 135.  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329–30 (1978). 
 136.  See United States v. Bryant, 136 U.S. 1954 (2016). 
 137.  See generally, Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A 
Jurisdictional Theory, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 769 (2009).  However, conventional notions regarding 
the “distinct sovereignty” theory as applied under the double jeopardy clause is currently being 
challenged in the Supreme Court case, U.S. v. Gamble, __U.S.__(2019). 
 138.  Singh, supra note 134 at 221. 
 139.  Id; See, Zhang, supra note 127 and accompanying text.  Utilizing this argument may in 
fact clear the way for a potential Article III counterargument, in that by recognizing the SDVCJ as 
stemming from the sovereign tribal nation the courts in which they are prosecuted may no longer 
be considered a non-Article III, Congressionally-sanctioned court.   
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C.  The Trump Administration on Indian Affairs 
Native American women are in a dire situation, and VAWA will need 
to be reauthorized by Congress in order to continue to provide the necessary 
financial resources to its various programs.  This is incredibly concerning, 
particularly given that major oppositionists to Article IX are now appointed 
to chief positions in the Trump administration.  Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, who opposed the VAWA legislation in 2013, skirted around a 
question about defending VAWA during his confirmation hearing, stating 
only that “[he] would defend the statute if it’s reasonably defensible.”140
Compounding this, the Trump administration has been successively 
pushing for the privatization of tribal lands, and has proposed severe cuts to 
the budget of VAWA and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.141  Critics to the 
current administration’s new budget proposal argue that it prioritizes the 
construction of a border-wall over tribal land, the privatization of Native 
reservations, and cuts to vital health services and education programs, all to 
the detriment of Native people.142  This budget proposes cuts of up to “$300 
million to the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well 
as $64 million from education, and over 21 million from Indian Country law 
enforcement.”143  Such propositions have many concerned that the current 
President is reverting back to a “Termination-Era” style of governing the 
tribes, which had disastrous effects on the tribes in the early twentieth 
century by diminishing their lands and their sovereignty, and ultimately 
forcing them to disband.144  While the current administration has not 
 140.  Kate Segal, Immigration Orders Undermine Violence Against Women Act Protections,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/13/immigration-
orders-undermine-violence-against-women-act-protections.
 141.  Tom Perez, Trump is Breaking the Federal Government’s Promise to Native Americans,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-perez-native-american-
indians-trump-20170807-story.html; see also Rob Capriccioso, Trump Budget Serves Deep Cuts in 
Many Indian Areas, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Jun. 6, 2017), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/ 
news/politics/tribal-budget-serves-deep-cuts-indian-areas. 
 142.  Id.
 143.  Hayley Miller, Trump’s Policies Show Profound Disregard for Native Americans, DNC 
Chair Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-
native-americans-tom-perez_us_59889853e4b0ca8b1d49e6df. 
 144.  Id.  During the Eisenhower administration in the mid-twentieth century, scores of tribes 
were “terminated,” i.e. stripped of their federal status, their benefits, and their land.  See generally
STEPHAN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO 
INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS (3d. ed. 2002).  Beginning in the early 50’s, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, accompanying the termination policy, sought to “relocate” Native Americans into urban 
cities and jobs.  This was accomplished by distributing flyers and brochures “advertising” the urban 
areas as places where Native people could find jobs, proper training, and “Happy Homes.”  NATIVE 
PEOPLE’S CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND ILLNESS (2018), https://www.nlm.nih.gov/ nativevoices/ 
timeline/488.html.  However, fifty percent of those who left the reservations returned within a few 
years due to lack of opportunity in the urban cities.  Id. See supra Part II Section A. 
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completely reverted back to such extreme measures, these threats only 
compound the distrust that has long existed between Native tribes and the 
federal government. 
IV.  Revisiting VAWA, and its Proposed 2019 Reauthorization: 
A.  National Congress of American Indians Report – 5 Years 
Later
VAWA 2013 made great strides in protecting Native women and men 
from IPV by affirming, in part, the inherent sovereign authority of Native 
American tribes.  However, many issues have arisen from the 2013 
reauthorization that have left tribal prosecutors feeling that the SDVCJ, as it 
currently stands, is both insufficient and inadequate to address the root of 
these problems.  In March 2018, the National Congress of American Indians 
(NCAI) released a new report summarizing the first five years of extended 
tribal domestic violence jurisdiction.145  The released report highlighted 
many of SDVCJ’s achievements, as well as the many gaps that need to be 
filled in the next Congressional reauthorization.146  Since 2013, the eighteen 
tribes that have implemented the SDVCJ collectively made 143 arrests and 
74 convictions, with 24 cases pending.147  Additionally, the report attempts 
to refute the conservative argument, that non-Native defendants are being 
denied their Due Process rights, by pointing to the high number of dismissals 
and acquittals.148  To further support this point, the report has utilized 
testimonials of each tribe that describe the proper jury trials and defense 
counsel appointed to defendants.149
The NCAI report is incredibly thorough in demonstrating the successes 
tribes have had with implementing the SDVCJ.  However, the report 
highlights myriad deficiencies in the current legislation.  Presently, tribes are 
unable to charge cases of assault on law enforcement, criminal contempt, 
 145.  NCAI Releases Five-Year Report on Tribal Governments Exercising VAWA 2013 Special 
Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AMERICAN 
INDIANS (Mar. 20, 2018), http://www.ncai.org/news/articles/2018/03/20/ncai-releases-five-year-
report-on-tribal-governments-exercising-vawa-2013-special-domestic-violence-criminal-
jurisdiction-over-non-indians [hereinafter NCAI Report]. 
 146.  Id. at 1.   
 147.  Id. at 10–11.  Please note that this report was released in March 2018, and numbers to 
present day may vary, as tribes no longer have to report to the DOJ that they are implementing the 
SDVCJ, and many arrests may occur in a given year. 
 148.  Id. at 18.  Statistics from the report show that approximately twenty-one percent of cases 
filed under SDVCJ were dismissed, often for insufficient evidence, and lack of tribal jurisdiction.   
 149.  Id. at 16 (“While the defendant was in jail awaiting trial, tribal police were informed that 
he had outstanding state warrants for drug trafficking.  His state appointed public defender, who 
was already licensed to practice in tribal court, was able to serve as defense counsel in both cases.”). 
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stalking, driving under the influence, endangering the welfare of a minor 
(and other crimes of child abuse), violence against victim’s family, and false 
imprisonment.150  In spite of this, advocates are hopeful that a 2019 
reauthorization will address these issues, and tribal criminal authority will 
be expanded to serve these victims.
B.  A 2019 Reauthorization? 
Despite the longest government shut-down in American history, 
Congress enacted emergency measures to ensure VAWA’s funding through 
February 8, 2019.151  However, the funding bill issued on February 14, 2019, 
excludes the extension of VAWA for the 2019 year.152  It is unclear the 
impact this will have in the coming months, as grant-related programs are 
funded through separate means, which have been provided for in this 
extension.153  Nevertheless, according to national news outlets, Democrats 
plan to push for further legislation and a broader overhaul in the upcoming 
months in order to expand the scope of funding and protections.154
In July 2018, Representative Jackson Lee (D-TX) introduced a bill to 
reauthorize VAWA.155  The new bill includes numerous provisions to 
address issues facing the tribal law enforcement, namely increasing tribal 
access to federal crime databases.156  Additionally, this new proposal seeks 
to fill the gaps created in VAWA 2013, by including protection for child 
abuse, sex trafficking, and elder abuse as crimes under the purview of the 
 150.  NCAI Report, supra note 145, at 23–24.  The report notes that 58% of the incidents 
involved children, as they are not considered “victims” under the VAWA 2013 definitions. Id. at 
23.  Child abuse on Native lands is incredibly prevalent.  Id. at 24.  Native children 2.5 times as 
likely to experience trauma than their non-Native counterparts, and this abuse has both immediate 
and long-term effects on the children.  Id.
 151.  Elise Viebeck, Violence Against Women Act Expires with Government Shutdown, WASH.
POST (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/violence-against-women-act-
to-expire-with-government-shutdown/2018/12/21/b66f600a-0557-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_sto 
ry.html?utm_term=.5f16e8af5d36. 
 152.  Sophie Tatum, et al., Funding bill leaves out Violence Against Women Act extension,
CNN (Feb. 15, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/15/politics/violence-against-
women-act-spending-bill/index.html. 
 153.  Id.
 154.  See Niels Lesniewski, In bid to avoid shutdown, spending deal drops Violence Against 
Women Act extension, other contentious provisions, ROLL CALL (Feb. 13, 2019, 9:50 PM), 
https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/bid-avoid-another-shutdown-spending-conference-
report-drops-violence-women-act-extension-contentious-provisions..
 155.  Katherine Tully-McManus, Pelosi, Deb Haaland Stump for Violence Against Women Act,
ROLL CALL (Aug. 7, 2018, 2:23 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/nancy-pelosi-
stumps-deb-haaland-new-mexico; see Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2018, H.R. 
6545 115th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2018). 
 156.  H.R. 6545 § 903 (a), (c). 





      04/24/2019   08:06:49
OLSON_FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019 4:47 PM
846 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:4 
SDVCJ that can be prosecuted by tribal officers.157  This proposal was 
applauded by Democrats and victim advocates for increasing the abilities of 
tribal law enforcement, and gained 181 Democratic co-sponsors.158  While 
this particular version has not been touched since September of 2018, 
Representative Karen Bass (D-CA) introduced yet another reauthorization 
bill, H.R. 1585, in March 2019.159  This bill addresses many of the same 
issues as its predecessor, and includes expanded tribal authority to try 
perpetrators of elder abuse, child abuse and assaults against tribal officers.160
On April 4, the House passed the bill forward, where it awaits Senate 
review.161  The provisions within H.R. 1585 are quite promising, in that it 
directly addresses two main issues identified by the tribes and the NCAI 
report: child abuse and acts of violence against tribal officers. 
The addition of the SDVCJ in 2013 was one of the main points of 
contention for Republican Congress members.162  Concerns stem largely 
from the constitutional issues of double jeopardy and ensuring due process 
rights to non-Native American defendants in tribal courts.  As such, any 2019 
reauthorization will no doubt face the same hurdle, and despite current 
success within a Democratic-majority House, the reauthorization may not 
reach Senate approval.  Despite the current “political board game,” Native 
women experience violence at incredibly high rates, vastly disproportionate 
to the remainder of the U.S. population.  These women need action now. 
V.  State-Led “Stop-Gap” Solutions 
In an ideal world the next VAWA reauthorization must include 
protections for children and elders, and would expand jurisdiction for 
stranger rape, or sexual assault by non-tribal members who do not fit the 
 157.  H.R. 6545 § 906. 
 158.  Bills Sponsored by Sheila Jackson Lee, 115th Cong. (2017–18), https://projects.pro 
publica.org/represent/members/J000032-sheila-jackson-lee/bills-sponsored/115; in an effort to 
reignite the issue and draw attention specifically to Native women and children, in late January 
Senator Tom Udall (D-NM) introduced S. 290, the Native Youth and Tribal Officer Protection Act 
in late January.  Native Youth and Tribal Officer Protection Act, S. 290, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2019).  This bill, focuses solely on expanding the ability to prosecute for crimes of child violence 
and abuse, as well as violence against tribal law enforcement officers.  Id.
 159.  Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019, H.R. 1585, 116th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2019), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1585/text. 
 160.  Id.
 161.  Katherine Tully-McManus, Violence Against Women Act clears House, ROLL CALL (Apr. 
4, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/violence-women-act-clears-house. 
 162.  Mercedes White, Why some oppose extension to the Violence Against Women Act,
DESERET NEWS (Feb. 14, 2013, 12:10 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865573 
170/Why-some-oppose-extension-to-Violence-Against-Women-Act.html; Seung Min Kim, Senate 
renews anti-violence law, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2009, 3:10 PM), https://www.Politi 
co.com/story/2013/02/ senate-passes-violence-against-women-act-087518.
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statute’s parameters of an “intimate partner.”  Despite a Democratic House 
majority, an expansion of tribal authority will no doubt face push back from 
several Congressional leaders, as they echo their same concerns from the 
2013 reauthorization.  Despite the advent of the SDVCJ, federal, state and 
tribal law enforcement have competing interests and complex jurisdictional 
“gaps” remain.  In this next section, this Note posits that in order to avoid 
the weaknesses that arguably exist within the current VAWA legislation, 
state and local government officials should adopt and mirror the 
methodology utilized by Oregon, Arizona, Wisconsin and other states to 
increase state-tribal cooperation and coordination to better fill this 
“patchwork” jurisdiction and created by federal legislation and Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. 
A.  Oregon’s Approach 
Within the last two decades, Oregon has made significant leaps in trying 
to bridge some of these gaps between state and tribal authorities, and 
recognizing the authority of tribal police officers in limited circumstances.163
In 2011, Oregon’s governor signed Senate Bill 412, giving tribal peace 
officers in the states’ nine federally recognized tribes the same status and 
authority to make arrests on tribal lands as state police officers, so long as 
tribal officers complied with training and insurance requirements.164  Despite 
initial concerns by conservatives and local sheriffs that this new authority 
would lead to the tribal peace officers becoming the “most powerful law 
enforcement of the state,”165 this bill has been very successful for the state of 
Oregon, and has garnered massive support from tribal authorities, state 
legislators, and victims’ rights advocates alike.166
Most of the Oregon tribes are now “412 compliant” with the training 
and insurance liability requirements.  The few exceptions involve smaller 
tribes that have entered into a direct contractual agreement with local Oregon 
state law enforcement in nearby municipalities.167
By requiring tribal police to go through the same training as state police 
and giving them the ability to go on and off the reservation to investigate 
 163.  See State v. Kurtz, 350 Or. 65 (2011) (reaffirming Oregon Supreme Court holding in 
2005 that tribal officers may make off-reservation arrests while in “hot pursuit”). 
 164.  2011 Ore. SB-412 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 161.015(4)(f) (2013)). 
 165.  Lauren Dake, Senate OKs Tribal Police Bill; State sheriffs group expresses concern as 
legislation moves to House, THE BEND BULLETIN, (June 7, 2011), http://www.bendbulletin.com 
/news/1416972-151/senate-oks-tribal-police-bill.  The conflicting jurisdictions that operate within 
tribal lands create what is monickered as a “checkerboard effect.”  
 166.  Id.
 167.  STATE OF OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CRIME VICTIM’S SERVICES DIVISION,
OREGON DEPT. OF JUSTICE VAWA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 2014-2016, https://www.doj.state.or. 
us/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/20142016_stop_vawa_implementation_plan_appendices.pdf. 





      04/24/2019   08:06:49
OLSON_FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019 4:47 PM
848 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:4 
crimes and pursue criminal suspects, this bill has “eliminated the 
checkerboard effect,” of competing federal-state-tribal jurisdictions, and is 
one of the first major steps in filling in these “gaps.”168  While this bill was 
set for a sunset date of 2015, the immense support it received from tribal 
officials and Oregon state troopers alike propelled it through the sunset 
period and it is now a permanent piece of legislation.169
B.  Arizona’s Inter-governmental Agreements 
Similar to Oregon, Arizona statute 13-3874(A) gives tribal officers the 
same enforcement powers as the state police so long as tribal officers comply 
with training and insurance requirements.170  This varies slightly from 
Oregon’s statute in that the Arizona’s definition of a police officer remains 
the same, but tribal officers are granted extended authority beyond the 
borders of the reservation.171
 In addition, Arizona’s governor has made a variety of agreements with 
local law enforcement and certain tribes, namely the Navajo Nation.172  In 
the last few years, domestic violence crisis calls have nearly doubled in the 
Navajo Nation,173 and the need for continued safety enhancements is greater 
than ever.  The Navajo Nation has since agreed to direct cooperation with 
the Arizona Department of Public Safety, allowing them to enter onto tribal 
lands, so long as there is communication and cooperation with Nation peace 
 168.  Janine Robben, Life In Indian Country: How the Knot of Criminal Jurisdiction is 
Strangling Community Safety, OREGON STATE BAR, (Jan. 2012), https://www.osbar.org/pub 
lications/bulletin/12jan/indiancountry.html. 
 169.  Id; see also Testimony Before the House Judiciary Committee In Support of Senate Bill 
343, https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2015R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/68579.  
 170.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3874(A) (2019) 
 171.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3874(B) (2019).  For comparison purposes, Oregon statute 
actually modified the definition of “peace officer” to include tribal officers that are members of a 
duly recognized federal tribe, and comply with various record-sharing and due process 
requirements.  “The Legislative Assembly finds and declares that the purpose of sections 1 to 4 of 
this 2011 Act is to provide authorized tribal police officers with a limited ability to exercise the 
powers of, and to receive the same authority and protections provided to, law enforcement officers 
under the laws of this state . . .” 2011 Ore. SB 412 §3 (1).  Arizona’s statute simply gives the tribe’s 
extended powers under the law, and they are not part of the code as a “peace officer.” 
 172.  Law Enforcement Agreement Between the Navajo Nation and The Arizona Department 
of Public Safety, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES, https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/reso 
urces/documents/ILOCFH_PhxAZ_Ref_AZNavajo_LawEnfAgreement.pdf. 
 173.  Delegates Walk with Grandma Emma In Support of Domestic Violence Awareness,
NATIVE NEWS ONLINE.NET, (Oct. 20, 2017), https://nativenewsonline.net/currents/delegates-walk-
grandma-emma-support-domestic-violence-awareness/ (Arizona state representative remarking 
that the number of calls from the nation have increased from 3,300 to 6,400 over the course of three 
years [2014-present].). 
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officers.174  This Act has been in place for the last five years, and according 
to the Arizona Office of the Attorney General, its overall success has 
prompted plans to renew this agreement for the future.175
C.  Other State Approaches: Immunity Waivers and Criminal 
Extradition 
Many states have also agreed to enhance the authority of the tribal 
police force, provided they maintain their own separate liability insurance or 
property insurance for damages incurred.  This is usually coupled with a 
provision that requires the tribal officers to waive their sovereign immunity 
in case of lawsuits against them.  Washington and Kansas state statutes both 
allow for tribal officers to exercise similar authority to state police officers 
so long as they release the State from any liability, and if they are sued it is 
done so separately from the state police, and proceeds under state tort law.176
Extraditing criminal offenders on or off tribal lands has been deeply 
challenging and has only compounded the violence and drug abuse that is 
rife within tribal lands.  Because of the jurisdictional gaps, many offenders 
can “flee” from law enforcement by simply staying on or off the reservation, 
knowing that law enforcement, absent any state-level agreement, cannot 
sustain any authority over them.  One example is the Pine Ridge reservation, 
where reports estimate that of the “111 misdemeanor warrants on domestic 
violence cases, 73 were for those believed to be on reservation land.”177
Wisconsin has a rather unique approach towards extradition with the 
Menominee Indian Nation, whereupon the tribe has codified their own 
criminal extradition procedures.  The Menominee code gives full faith and 
credit to state warrants for a period of 48 hours, after which the tribal judge 
can release the offender or grant more time to the state to move the offender 
into state jurisdiction.178
 174.  Law Enforcement Agreement Between the Navajo Nation and The Arizona Department 
of Public Safety, supra note 172, at 82. 
 175.  FY 2017 First Quarter Report, NAVAJO NATION OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. (Dec. 2016),
http://www.nnols.org/uploads/FileLinks/c6f6c1361361424c9666a0b2201405e7/NNDOJ_First_Q
uarterly_Report_to_NNC_FY17.pdf. 
 176.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2401a(3)(e) (2018) “Neither the state nor any political 
subdivision of the state shall be liable for any act or failure to act by any tribal law enforcement 
officer.” See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2401a(3)(b) (2018) “The tribe shall waive its sovereign 
immunity solely to the extent necessary to permit recovery under the liability insurance.”  See
generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.92 (LexisNexis 2018).   
 177.  Tiffany Tan, Oglala Sioux planning mutual aid with outside enforcement, RAPID CITY 
JOURNAL (May 28, 2017), http://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/oglala-sioux-planning-extradition -
mutual-aid-with-outside-law-enforcement/article_986ae136-6598-526e-8ab0-8d8b4d1490d7.html. 
 178.  Menominee Indian Tribe of WI Code, Art. 2 §132–6 (B). 
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The Arizona statute similarly affords the right to both Indian tribes and 
the state to seek extradition of criminal offenders from their respective 
jurisdictions, provided they follow tribal or state procedural due process.179
Both of these models allow state and tribal officers to seek out a criminal 
offender, which would otherwise be beyond their respective reach, and helps 
further close those jurisdictional gaps on the reservations. 
D.  Potential Hurdles with the State Enforcement Model 
Although states have enacted several agreements and procedures to 
address the issues of violence on tribal lands at a more localized level, the 
tribal-state relationships remain fraught with many underlying issues that 
often cloud the efforts to finding a resolution to the violence on tribal lands.  
Stemming from years of abuse and land disenfranchisement of Native 
peoples, state governments have had a less than ideal relationship with tribal 
authorities.  A common complaint of tribes is the lack of respect or 
knowledge that the state law enforcement has about the individual tribes and 
their culture.180  Should the states attempt to further exert their jurisdiction 
over certain tribes in place of the federal authorities, this could lead to an 
increase in conflict. 
The Northern California Tribal Court Coalition’s (NCTCC) 2013 report 
describes several instances in which members of Northern California tribes 
had issues with law enforcement’s handling of 911 calls.181  An account by 
a 911 service provider states: 
When I’ve been here in town, there have been times when a 
woman has reported, a police officer has taken her out to the curb 
and said he’s not going to file a report because he doesn’t think 
she is serious and he has had dealings with her before, and she 
didn’t follow through, so he is not going to waste his time.  So if 
you have a history of domestic violence, you are much less likely 
to get help from the police department.182
 179.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3869(D), providing that Indian tribes demanding 
extradition must provide a copy of a warrant and a criminal complaint made before a tribal judge. 
 180.  RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TRIBAL COMMUNITIES: A REGIONAL SURVEY OF 
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION (Jan. 2013), https://www.courtinnovatio 
n.org/sites/default/files/documents/ NCTCC_Responses_D_V.pdf [hereinafter NCTCC SURVEY]
(where respondents believed the law enforcement issues lied within their lack of knowledge about 
the individual tribes). 
 181.  Id.
 182.  Id. at 30. 
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One potential way to combat this, particularly in the context of domestic 
violence, is to increase police training about the issue, focusing specifically 
on the ways in which domestic violence affects the tribal members and their 
community.  While this would naturally require a degree of cooperation 
between local and tribal authorities, as well as more education about the 
cultural norms within each tribe, it would ultimately foster a better 
relationship. 
Additionally, the NCTCC has reported that the tribes in Northern 
California tend to be unaware of the resources available to them and thus are 
hesitant to reach out for assistance.183  “Temporary housing and shelter care, 
vouchers for immediate needs, court advocacy, safety planning, crisis 
counseling, and re-location assistance are some of the other services . . . 
[however,] groups of interest, specifically community members, victims, and 
perpetrators, revealed limited knowledge of such resources.”184  Increasing 
awareness through community involvement on and off the reservation would 
alleviate some of these issues.  However, such a feat would no doubt require 
extra funding provided by the state governments, which presents another 
obstacle for domestic violence victims and their advocates. 
On the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, local tribal authorities cite 
similar feelings of unease in entrusting local government with criminal 
jurisdiction.  The tribe has seen a vast increase in violent crime, as well as 
an increased spread of methamphetamine addiction from drug traffickers in 
nearby metropolitan areas.185  Given a lack of funding, there has been a 
significant decrease in tribal law enforcement authority on the reservation, 
as well as issues extraditing perpetrators to and from the reservation.186  But 
tribal members are skeptical of any agreement with their neighboring county 
officials––this is mostly due to hostile encounters with state police which 
include racial profiling and disparate treatment, as well as a justifiable fear 
of a “domino effect” that such an agreement would have on decreasing their 
autonomy.187
Similarly, the Navajo Nation has expressed much concern over their 
extradition policies with the states of New Mexico and Arizona.  While 
policies are in place to ensure the due process rights of the Indians that are 
arrested and held on the reservation, there have been many complaints that 
officials ignore these proceedings in removing offenders to state and federal 
 183.  NCTCC SURVEY, supra note 180, at 30. 
 184.  Id.
 185.  Ian MacDougall, Should Indian Reservations Give Local Cops Authority on Their Land?
THE ATLANTIC (July 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/police-pine-
ridge-indian-reservation/534072/.
 186.  Id.
 187.  Id.
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jurisdictions.  “[I]t was common practice for federal agents to show up on 
the reservation and pick up an individual without due process . . . People 
would come in and literally badge out an individual from tribal custody 
without any process at all.”188  Such blatant ignorance and disrespect for 
tribal procedure leaves many tribes questioning why they should bother 
entering into these agreements with state and local law enforcement.189  This 
is not to say that the extradition treaties are unimportant, yet it nevertheless 
highlights some of the issues that are necessary for states and tribes to work 
through, including respect, understanding, and safeguarding their respective 
measures of due process. 
Conclusion
The proposed legislation that is advancing in Congress may finally 
reaffirm tribal criminal sovereignty and expand the rights of tribal 
prosecutors.  However, given the current political climate, the future of a 
2019 reauthorization remains uncertain for the 18 tribes that exercise 
jurisdiction.  Though an imperfect framework, solidifying the relationships 
between state and tribal law enforcement has been shown to have a greater 
impact on tribal communities and the safety of Indian women.  To heal from 
the disastrous impact of PL 280, many states have been granting the tribal 
police the same authority to prosecute as state enforcement officers, and 
tribal law enforcement have been negotiating arrangements that fit their 
needs in order to protect members on reservations.  As demonstrated in 
Oregon, Arizona, and other states, this increase in authority can extend off 
the reservation in particular cases, thus preventing the perpetrators from 
becoming “untouchable” once they cross the reservation lines. 
This particular “stop gap” framework is not without complications.  The 
expansion of tribal authority has, in a number of cases, amplified mistrust 
among state law enforcement, and the allowance of state troopers on tribal 
lands resonates a similar feeling among tribal authorities.  These hurdles can 
hopefully be overcome in time through cooperation, domestic violence 
training, and cultural awareness, but nevertheless continues to present a 
substantial obstacle. 
The advent of VAWA’s SDVCJ and the TLOA are beacons of hope for 
a shifting political tide in removing some of the impediments to tribal 
sovereignty.190  But, the laws also present “a paradox” in that with “increased 
authority comes greater federal interference and more oversight into internal 
 188.  Noel Lyn Smith, Stronger Extradition laws proposed in wake of Carroll sentencing, NAVAJO 
TIMES (July 4, 2013), http://www.navajotimes.com/news/2013/0713/070413extradition.php. 
 189.  Id.
 190.  Riley, supra note 94, at 1595. 
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tribal institutions and processes.”191  By imposing federally derived 
legislation upon the tribes, we are inherently drawing tribes further away 
from any semblance of political and cultural autonomy and imposing “an 
American model of criminal justice.”192  By doing this, we are sending the 
tribes into a “double bind,” upon which their sovereign rights are only 
guaranteed if they operate on “the terms of the very government that has, for 
so long, sought to dismantle tribal justice systems.”193
Ideally, the federal legislature will expand the reach of VAWA and the 
TLOA beyond their current parameters in a 2019 reauthorization.  However, 
we are nevertheless forced to reconcile this with the politics of the current 
federal government and the uncertainty of funding available to assist in any 
further progressive action.  This Note modestly attempts to show that by 
putting the immediate needs of Native American women and domestic 
violence victims first, the local-tribal police cooperation model has the 
potential for substantial benefits to those affected by domestic violence.  
These state and local agreements and legislative measures can enhance trust 
and coordination between tribal and local law enforcement and, perhaps, will 
continue to foster the relationship between them, hopefully resulting in 
increased tribal sovereignty over criminal affairs. 
 191.  Riley, supra note 94, at 1595. 
 192.  Id.
 193.  Id.
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